内部控制缺陷、政治晋升预期与高管腐败

Internal Control Defects,Political Promotion Expectation and Executives' Corruption

中国国有企业高管是准官员性质,其对职务晋升有着很高的预期,同时作为降低公司内部各层级代理成本的内部控制存在缺陷是绝对的。本文选取2010-2018年国有上市公司高管腐败的数据为样本,深入探究内部控制缺陷、政治晋升预期与高管腐败之间的关系。研究发现,公司内部控制缺陷会诱使高管进行更多的腐败行为,政治晋升预期与高管腐败呈显著负相关关系,并且政治晋升预期可以在一定程度上缓解公司内部控制缺陷诱发的高管腐败行为。本文的研究结论为政府相关管理部门建立合理的激励机制以综合治理高管腐败行为提供了有益的启示。

The executives of state-owned enterprise in China are quasi officials,who have a high expectation of job promotion.And the defects of internal control to reduce the agency cost of all levels of the company are absolute.Taking the data of the corruption of these executives in China's state-owned listed companies from 2010 to 2018 as a sample,we explore the relationship between the defects of internal control,political promotion expectation and executives'corruption.We find that the internal control defects will induce more corrupt behaviors of executives.The political promotion expectation has a significant negative correlation with executives'corruption,and the political promotion expectation can alleviate the corrupt behaviors of executives caused by the internal control defects.The conclusion of this study provides useful enlightenment for the government and other relevant management authorities to establish a reasonable incentive mechanism to comprehensively govern executives'corruption.