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基于Stackelberg安全博弈的动态防御策略选取方法

Dynamic Defense Strategy Selection Method Based on Stackelberg Security Game
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摘要 网络攻防对抗的本质是攻防双方非对等主体之间的博弈过程。针对现有网络防御策略研究中攻防博弈双方主体地位对等的先验假设缺陷,将博弈论非对等局中人思想引入网络防御策略生成模型构建过程,提出一种基于Stackelberg安全博弈的动态防御策略生成方法,通过建立网络模型,利用Stackelberg安全博弈强均衡策略算法生成网络的最优防御策略,既充分考虑攻防行为中双方关系彼此影响,又能确保防御策略生成的准确性。实验结果表明所提模型和方法的可行性和有效性。所提模型和方法能够加强系统的安全性。 Network attack-defense confrontation is essentially a game process between the non-equal subject of attack and defense.In the research of the existing network defense strategy,there is a priori hypothesis defect of equal status between the subjects of the attack and defense game.Game theory is introduced into the process of constructing network defense strategy generation model,and a dynamic defense strategy generation method based on Stackelberg security game is proposed.By establishing the network model,the Stackelberg security game strong equilibrium strategy algorithm is used to generate the optimal defense strategy,which not only fully considers the influence of the relationship between the two sides in the attack and defense behavior,but also ensures the accuracy of the defense strategy generation.The experimental results show that the proposed model and method are feasible and effective,and can enhance the security of the system.
作者 葛潇月 周天阳 臧艺超 朱俊虎 GE Xiaoyue;ZHOU Tianyang;ZANG Yichao;ZHU Junhu(State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing,Information&Engineering University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;National Digital Switching System Engineering&Technology Research Center,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处 《计算机工程与应用》 CSCD 北大核心 2020年第17期129-135,共7页 Computer Engineering and Applications
基金 国家自然科学基金(No.61502528)。
关键词 网络攻防 STACKELBERG博弈 策略选取 network attack and defense Stackelberg game policy selection
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