内部控制、僵尸企业与审计特征

Internal Control,Zombie Enterprise and Audit Characteristics

以2010—2017年深沪两市全部A股上市公司为研究样本,分析僵尸企业的审计特征并探讨内部控制对两者关系的调节效应。研究发现:相比于非僵尸企业,僵尸企业具有倾向于支付更低的审计费用、更有可能收到非标意见和更有可能选择非高质量审计师进行审计的特征,同时,僵尸企业内部控制环境更差。进一步研究发现,更高的内部控制质量使得僵尸企业更有可能收到标准无保留的审计意见,但非僵尸企业审计收费更高且更有可能选择高质量审计师。基于产权性质的进一步研究发现:(1)国有僵尸企业支付更低的审计费用,且中央国企支付的审计费用更低;(2)民营僵尸企业更有可能收到非标审计意见;(3)民营僵尸企业和地方国有僵尸企业更有可能选择非高质量审计师进行审计,且地方国有僵尸企业倾向性更强。从公司治理角度研究僵尸企业的审计特征,为识别僵尸企业提供了经验证据。

Taking all A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2010 to 2017 as a research sample,this paper analyzes the audit characteristics of zombie companies and explores the moderating effect of internal control on the relationship between them.The study finds that compared with non-zombie companies,zombie companies tend to pay lower audit fees,and are more likely to receive non-standard opinions,to choose non-high-quality auditors for audit.Besides,their internal control environment is more likely to be weaker.Further research finds that higher internal control quality makes zombie enterprises more likely to receive standard and unreserved audit opinions,but non-zombie companies with better internal control quality tend to pay higher audit fees and to choose high-qualified auditors.Further research based on the nature of property rights finds that:(1)state-owned zombies tend to pay lower audit fees,in which the central state-owned enterprises audit fee is likely to be even lower;(2)private zombies are more likely to receive“non-standard”audit opinions;(3)private zombies and local state-owned zombies are more likely to choose unqualified auditors,and local state-owned zombies are more inclined to do that.The study about the audit characteristics of zombies from the perspective of corporate governance provides empirical evidence for identifying zombies.