监管成本驱动下施工企业围标行为演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis on together-conspired bidding behaviors of construction enterprises driven by government supervision cost

针对招投标活动中的围标问题,利用演化博弈理论,分析了围标人、陪标人及政府在不同决策下的期望收益,构建了博弈三方在不完全理性条件下的非对称演化博弈模型,同时利用系统动力学模型对博弈三方行为的演化进行仿真,并从政府监管成本驱动角度分析了影响博弈主体行为的主要因素。结果表明:降低监管成本、加大对围标人和陪标人的处罚力度、提高监管成功率对抑制招投标活动中的投标人围标有显著促进作用,但提高政府监管部门成功监管的激励收益对抑制围标与陪标行为则无显著效果。最后,提出了建立失信联合惩戒制度、构建集中监管机制、借助大数据平台监管以降低监管成本提高监管效率等政策建议。

The evolutionary game theory model was used to analyze the expected returns of the game participants in together-conspired bidding under different decisions.The system dynamics model was established to simulate the evolution behaviors of the game participants.The main factors influencing the evolution of the game participants were analyzed from the perspective of government supervision cost.The result showed that reducing regulatory costs,increasing penalties for together-conspired bidding,and increasing the success rate of supervision had significant effect on suppressing together-conspired bidding,but increasing the incentive income of successful supervision of government had little effect.Then some policy suggestions,such as establishing a joint disciplinary system for dishonesty,establishing a centralized supervision mechanism,and using big data platform for supervision to reduce supervision costs and improve supervision efficiency,were put forward.