“无意志道德责任”的悖论——评析苏德超教授自然主义立场的自相矛盾

The Paradox of“Involuntary Moral Responsibility”:On the Contradiction in Su Dechao’s Naturalist Position

苏德超教授有力地反驳了主张自由意志不受因果链条制约的激进意志论,却又站在自然主义的立场上否定了意志的存在和意义,认为“无意志的道德责任”能够把自由与自然统一起来,没有意识到自由与必然的二元对立架构同样会让他的见解陷入自败。回到现实中来可以发现,自由意志不仅像认知和情感那样真实存在于人们的主观心理中,而且还凭借与因果链条的两位一体关联,对于人生在世发挥着至关紧要的作用,尤其构成了道德责任的必要前提。

Su Dechao convincingly refuted the theory of radical will which held that free will was not restricted by the chain of cause and effect.However,his naturalist position rejected the existence and meaning of the will;he believed that“involuntary moral responsibility”can unify freedom and nature.Failure to realize the dualistic structure of freedom and necessity makes his views self-defeating.In reality,free will not only exists in the subjective psychology of cognition and emotion,but also plays a crucial role in one’s life in the world through the chain of cause and effect,especially as it constitutes the necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility.