论科学实践的认知结构

On the Cognitive Structure of Scientific Practice

科学是以知识为中心的集体实践,理解科学就是要从实践入手来说明知识上的成功。库恩的这个创见衍生出科学实践哲学颇有影响的两个版本,即爱丁堡学派的科学知识社会学和劳斯的科学政治哲学。这两种对科学实践的外在主义阐释,程度不同地偏离了库恩哲学的初衷。以求知为中心的集体实践包含两方面的诠释要求,一是说明个体的知行关系,二是澄清认知实践中个体与集体(共同体)之间的关系。以知行合一论和心智的分形结构来重释库恩《结构》中的洞见,可构想对科学实践的一种内在主义的自然主义诠释。

Scientific practice is a kind of collective activities pursuing for knowledge.This insight from T.S.Kuhn inspires two influential approaches in the philosophy of scientific practice,i.e.,sociology of scientific knowledge and political philosophy of science.But,their external explanation of scientific practice deviated from the original intention of T.S.Kuhn,especially the thoughts in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.This paper argues that,aninternalexplanation of scientific practice could be drawn from Kuhn’s thoughts,if we take collective intentionality and the circularity between actions and knowledge seriously.