集体腐败的博弈模型分析:生成、扩散与分化机制

Game Model Analysis of Collective Corruption:Mechanisms of Generation,Diffusion and Differentiation

集体腐败已经成为中国腐败发生的显著特征,在近年来查处的腐败案件中,集体腐败所占的比例日趋升高,如何有效治理集体腐败成为当前反腐败亟待解决的突出问题。集体腐败的发展伴随着博弈过程,体现在集体腐败的生成、扩散以及分化各个阶段。笔者结合理论模型分析了以上博弈过程,以此探究集体腐败的演化机理,提出从腐败查处率、权力制约和监督、激励机制以及举报人保护制度等方面加强集体腐败治理。

Collective corruption has become a prominent feature of corruption in China. The proportion of collective corruption in corruption cases investigated in recent years has been increasing. How to effectively manage collective corruption has become a prominent issue in China’s current anti-corruption process. The development of collective corruption is accompanied by the game process,which is reflected in the stages of generation,diffusion and differentiation of collective corruption. Therefore,the author combined the theoretical model to analyze the above game process,gradually explored the evolution mechanism of collective corruption,and suggested to strengthen collective corruption governance from the aspects of corruption investigation rate,restriction and supervise of power,incentive mechanism and whistleblower protection system.