年报问询函的监管溢出效应研究——来自企业集团A股上市子公司的证据

Spillover Effects of Comment Letters:Empirical Evidences from Conglomerates

现有研究主要关注于年报问询函对被问询公司的影响。基于2015-2018年企业集团上市子公司样本,文章研究交易所问询在企业集团内是否具有监管溢出效应。实证研究发现,年报问询函在子公司间存在监管溢出效应,即企业集团内子公司被年报问询会引起其他子公司财务报告质量的提高。机制检验证明,内外部资本市场的信息传递是年报问询函溢出效应的主要原因。拓展性分析发现,当企业集团存在共同审计和实际控制人的控制链条更短时,年报问询函的监管溢出效应就越明显。文章扩展了年报问询函政策实施效果的相关研究,延伸了财务决策同群效应理论假说,为优化上市公司监管机制提供思路。

Conglomerate is a system consists of many independent legal entities,which is an important form of strategic organization for current enterprise development.Under the control of the parent company,the main bodies of the conglomerate are connected to form a network structure through formal or informal relationship,and contagion effects of risk,reputation and irregularities exist within conglomerate.This shows that the financial decisions of subsidiaries are functions of the characteristics of other subsidiaries within the same conglomerate,and there exist peer effects in financial decisions.China’s stock exchanges started late in post-supervision of the information disclosure quality of listed companies by issuing financial report inquiry letters,and did not publicly disclose the details of the financial report inquiry letters of listed companies for the first time until 2014.The appearance of financial report inquiry letters indicates that the stock exchange in China has gradually become the main force of the supervision of listed companies.As an important symbol of the transformation of the supervision in the capital market,its implementation effect has been widely concerned.Previous studies mainly focus on the impact of inquiry letters on corporate itself.Inquiry letters can improve the information disclosure quality of listed companies,reducing the uncertainty of investors in the estimation of fair value,and alleviating information asymmetry,improving audit quality,reducing the risk of stock price crash,reducing the degree of corporate tax avoidance,and improving the performance forecast quality.This paper studies whether the subsidiaries being inquired by the exchanges have spillover effects.We find that:when a subsidiary is inquired,investors reassess other subsidiaries in the same conglomerate,causing spillover effects on other subsidiaries,that is,subsidiaries not receiving any financial report inquiry letter improve their subsequent information quality if Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange comment on the financial report of other subsidiaries in the same conglomerate.Further channel tests of the spillover effect show that the information transmission in the conglomerate’s internal capital market and external capital market can explain the spillover effect.Cross-sectional tests indicate that when the auditor interlock exists and the control chain of the controller is longer,the spillover effects of the financial report inquiry letters is more pronounced within the conglomerate.These findings suggest that financial report inquiry letters have a significant regulatory spillover effects within conglomerate.By exploring the spillover effects of financial report inquiry letters in conglomerates,this paper has the following theoretical and practical significance:Firstly,this paper expands the relevant literature on the implementation effect of inquiry letters.Secondly,this paper extends the research of peer effects in financial decision-making,and extends the study of peer effects from sociology to management,and from the perspective of industry or region to internal capital market.Finally,the conclusion of this paper provides ideas for optimizing the regulatory mechanism of listed companies,and provides theoretical support for the conclusion that the inquiry letter of the exchange is conducive to perfecting the financial regulatory system and keeping the bottom line of systemic financial risks.