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投资基金持股、产权性质与投资效率

Investment Fund Holdings,Nature of Property Rights and Investment Efficiency
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摘要 投资决策是决定企业成长发展的重要财务决策之一,并影响着市场资源配置的效率。在我国机构投资者迅速成长的背景下,本文以企业产权性质为分类依据,分别探讨投资基金持股在投资过度与投资不足情况下的治理作用。研究发现,在不同产权性质下,投资基金持股对企业投资不足行为均有显著的抑制作用,但对国有企业投资过度问题没有显著影响,对民营企业的投资过度行为反而有正向的推动作用。本文的研究结论对于规范企业投资行为和促进机构投资者的发展具有参考意义。 Investment decision-making is one of the important financial management decisions that determines the growth and development of enterprises,and affects the efficiency of market resource allocation.Affected by many factors,"nonefficiency investment"is widely used in current business management practices.Under the background of the rapid growth of institutional investors in China,this paper explores the governance role of investment fund holdings in the case of excessive investment and insufficient investment,based on the nature of corporate property rights.This study finds that under different property rights,investment fund holdings have a significant inhibitory effect on underinvestment behavior,and have no significant impact on the excessive investment of state-owned enterprises,while have a positive effect on the excessive investment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises.The conclusions of this paper provide an empirical basis for the relevant departments to formulate corresponding regulatory policies,and have a reference significance for regulating corporate investment behavior and the future development of institutional investors.
作者 邵贞棋 Shao Zhenqi(School of Business,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
出处 《未来与发展》 2020年第8期49-56,共8页 Future and Development
基金 国家社会科学基金重大项目“面向国际趋同的国家统一会计制度优化路径研究”(项目批准号:16ZDA029) 财政部2016年“会计名家培养工程”项目(财会[2016]15号) 中国人民大学2019年度拔尖创新人才培育资助计划成果。
关键词 投资基金持股 产权性质 投资效率 investment fund holdings nature of property rights investment efficiency
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