海德格尔与皮克林论物的开放性存在——兼论一种现象学式的科学存在论

Heidegger and Pickering on the Openness of Things ——Together on the Phenomenological Scientific Ontology

海德格尔解构了传统西方哲学中有关何谓人与物的对象性、概念认知性的理解,将人与物看作是可能性的开放性存在,这是因为存在(而非存在物层面上的东西)是存在物之存在的根据或原因,而作为此在的人的存在是通达存在本身的必然途径;皮克林在科学哲学领域沿袭了海德格尔关于物是开放性存在的思想,并且认为人类力量与物质力量在科学实践中都作为"开放性的终结"而存在,科学的本质并非对外在世界的表征与描摹,而是人类力量与物质力量在实践中"共舞""冲撞"的结果,它们在阻抗与适应的辩证法过程中相互交织、相互界定和共同演化。皮克林由此阐明了世界的本质乃是一个开放式终结演化的活生生的场所,并由此构建了一种现象学式的科学存在论思想。

Heidegger deconstructs the ontic understanding of beings in traditional western philosophy and he argues that the Being of beings(including human and non-human beings) are open and full of possibilities, because it is the Being itself, not the Being of beings, is the ontological root of beings, and Dasein is the only access to the Being itself. In philosophy of science, Pickering follows Heidegger’s idea of the openness of beings, and proposes that both human agency and material agency are open-ended in the scientific practices, and the essence of science is not the representation and depiction of the outer world, but the mangle and co-dancing of human agency and material agency. And these two factors are reciprocally and emergently intertwined in this mangle. Therefore, Pickering concludes that the world is always in a state of aliveness, evolution and open-endedness, and he constructs one kind of phenomenological scientific ontology.