外部盈利压力与企业盈余管理——基于创业板上市公司的实证检验

External Earnings Pressure and Earnings Management ——an Empirical Study on the Listed Companies on Growth Enterprise Market

以我国2013—2018年创业板上市公司为研究样本,考察了外部盈利压力对企业盈余管理的影响,并进一步探索了信息不对称和高管二职合一在两者关系间的调节作用。研究结果表明:外部盈利压力能够有效压制企业的真实盈余管理;这种压制的影响效果会随着信息不对称程度的提高而减小,进而转化成迎合机制;外部盈利压力的压制作用在CEO不兼任董事长的企业中更显著;但外部盈利压力对应计盈余管理的影响不显著。因此,适当的外部盈利压力有利于企业的长期业绩。为了发挥外部盈利压力的压制作用,应进一步规范我国上市公司的会计信息披露制度,增强证券分析师的分析预测水平以及控制企业内部高管权力很有必要。

Taking the listed companies on Growth Enterprise Market(GEM) from 2013 to 2018 as the research sample, this paper studies the effect of external earnings pressure on corporate earnings management, and further explores the impacts of information asymmetry and CEOs serving as chairmen of the board on the relationship between external earnings pressure and earnings management. The results indicate that: external earnings pressure can effectively suppress real corporate earnings management;the suppression decreases as information asymmetry increases, and then transforms into catering mechanism;and the suppression is more significant in the enterprises where CEOs don’t serve as chairmen of the board;however, the impact of external earnings pressure on accrual earnings management is not significant. Therefore, appropriate earnings pressure is beneficial to long-term enterprise performance. In order to exert the suppression, it is necessary to further standardize accounting information disclosure system in the listed companies, enhance forecast capability of securities analysts and control the executive power of CEOs.