国有企业横向并购反垄断控制的审查标准研究

A Study on Review Standards in Stated-owned Firms'Horizontal Merger Antitrust Control

反垄断当局对企业横向兼并的审查标准之争,即社会总福利标准与消费者剩余标准孰优孰劣,是当前领域内学者关注的热点话题之一。在我国不断推进国有企业混合所有制改革的现实背景下,本文构建一个两阶段博弈模型分析我国反垄断当局对国有企业横向并购反垄断控制的审查标准。结果表明,反垄断当局采用社会总福利标准进行并购的反垄断控制占优于消费者剩余标准。上述结论从社会福利效应的角度明确了我国反垄断当局关于并购反垄断控制的审查标准,为进一步推动“国民共进共赢”的中国特色并购模式提供了理论依据。

The dispute between the antitrust authorities'review standards for horizontal mergers of enterprises,that is,which is better or worse than the general social welfa re standard and the consumer surplus standard,is one of the hot topics concerned by scholars in the current field.Based on the background of mixed ownership reform,this paper constructs a two-stage game model to analyze the anti-monopoly review standard for the merger control of stateowned fi rms,and the effect of the proportion of state-owned shares on mixed-ownership fi rms formed after the mergers.The results show that the antitrust authority adopting the social welfare standard for antitrust control is superior to the consumer surplus standard.This paper clarifi es the review standard of antitrust merger control from the perspective of social welfare effect,which further promotes the win-win mode of mergers.