药企博弈机制与反向支付的经济政策规制

“Games between Pharmaceutical Enterprises and Economic Regulation of”Reserve Payment

欧美国家对医药行业比较流行的反向支付协议尚缺乏有效统一的规制手段。中国是仿制药大国,反向支付协议一旦在我国出现和流行,将严重破坏了医药品市场秩序。本文通过博弈论方法分析了反向支付协议的合谋形成条件,并用委托-代理理论探讨了反向支付协议合谋对社会经济造成破坏的机制,以及如何通过经济政策来规制反向支付合谋的形成。

In Europe and the United States,the reverse payment agreement which is popular in the pharmaceutical industry is still lack of effective and unified regulatory means.China is a big country of generic drugs industry.Once reverse payment agreement appears and prevails in China,it will seriously damage the market order of pharmaceutical industry.In this paper,we analyzed the formation conditions of the collusion of the reverse payment agreement with game theory,and discussed how the mechanism of the reverse payment agreement damage the social economy using the principal-agent theory,and we provide some suggestion to regulate the reverse payment from the economic policy.