基层法院法官激励因素与激励效果的实证研究——以S省部分基层法官为例

An Empirical Study on Incentive Factors and Effects for Judges from the Basic People's Courts——Taking Some Grassroots Judges of S Province as an Example

员额制改革及其配套措施对法官的激励作用是否发挥到位,事关本轮司法改革的成败。基于经济学理性选择理论的基本假设,我国基层法院法官受到收入、晋升、声誉、考核机制、工作量、福利保障、人身安全保障、工作环境、公平感、个人成就感等激励因素的影响,激励效果体现在是否愿意终身从事法官工作。实证研究得出,基层法官目前的年收入没有产生明显的激励效果,而收入的增幅、公平感和绩效奖金能否反映自身贡献,都有着显著正向激励作用;工作量、加班以及来自错案追究制、审判管理指标、信访等方面的工作压力有着显著的负向激励作用,也是引发离职倾向的最主要原因;晋升的难度、人身安全保障的不足有着显著的负向激励作用;荣誉称号对法官的激励效果并不显著。鉴于此,未来的改革应继续完善薪酬评价体系,扩展晋升渠道,完善考核奖惩机制,提升审判团队效率和职业保障水平。

To reform and improve the systems of judges'salaries and benefits as well as their security of tenure is a crucial factor for the Fifth Five-Year Reform Plan.Based on the basic hypothesis of rational choice theory,judges in the basic people's courts are motivated by income,promotion,reputation,assessment mechanism,workload,welfare guarantee,personal safety guarantee,working environment,sense of fairness,and personal achievement,etc.The effect lies in the willingness to work as a judge for life.The empirical study shows that the current annual income does not obviously incentive judges,the increase of income,sense of fairness and whether performance bonus can reflect their own contribution has significantly positive incentive effect.Workload,work pressure,the difficulty of promotion and the lack of personal safety guarantee have a significant negative incentive effect.The incentive effect of honorary titles on judges is not significant.The reform should continue to improve the salary evaluation system,expand promotion channels,improve the mechanism of assessment,reward and punishment,and improve the efficiency of the trial team and professional security.