行政审批制度改革、市场准入与异质性企业研发

Administrative approval system reform,market access and heterogeneous firm R&D

行政审批制度改革放松市场准入,产生逃离竞争和利润削弱两种效应,对不同生产率的在位企业研发产生不同影响。首先建立一个理论模型,推导在行政审批制度改革产生的逃离竞争效应和利润削弱效应共同作用下异质性企业的不同研发行为,并进一步利用1998—2007年中国工业企业数据,对此进行实证检验。理论推导发现:对于高生产率企业,行政审批制度改革产生的逃离竞争效应超过利润削弱效应,进而激励高生产率企业研发;而对于低生产率企业,行政审批制度改革产生的利润削弱效应超过逃离竞争效应,反而阻碍低生产率企业研发。利用地级市设立行政审批中心的自然实验进行实证研究发现,行政审批制度改革对企业研发的促进作用随着生产率的降低而递减,最终逆转为不利于低生产率企业研发。该结论不仅体现在集约边际上的企业研发投入,还体现在广延边际上企业是否选择研发,并在多种方法下依然稳健。

The reform of the administrative approval system eases market access,which has two effects,escape from competition and profit erosion,with different impacts on the R&D of incumbent firms at different levels of productivity.This paper firstly builds a theoretical model to deduce the different R&D behaviors of heterogeneous firms under the combined effects of escape from competition and profit erosion resulting from the administrative approval system reform,and further uses the data of Chinese industrial firms from 1998 to 2007 to conduct an empirical test.The theoretical derivation reveals that for high-productivity firms,the escape from competition effect of administrative approval system reform outweighs the profit weakening effect,thus stimulating R&D of high-productivity firms.In contrast,for low-productivity firms,the profit weakening effect of administrative approval system reform outweighs the escape from competition effect,and instead discourages R&D of low-productivity firms.An empirical study using natural experiments on the establishment of administrative approval centers in prefecture-level cities finds that the promotion of R&D by administrative approval system reform decreases with the decrease of productivity,and eventually reverses to disadvantage of low-productivity firm R&D.The conclusion is not only reflected in the R&D investment of firms on the intensive margin,but also in whether the firms choose R&D on the extensive margin,and it is still robust in varies methods.