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基于不同补贴主体的新能源汽车制造商定价决策研究 被引量:20

Research on New Energy Vehicle Manufacturers Pricing Decision Basis for Different Subsidy Bodies
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摘要 基于政府目前对新能源汽车消费者及制造商实施补贴的现实背景,假设两家技术水平不等的新能源汽车制造商所生产的产品之间存在替代关系,将制造商产品之间的价格和质量差异纳入考虑范围,构建了新能源汽车制造商最优定价模型,求解了在不同补贴方式下的最优定价方式,并在均衡状态下对模型进行了数值模拟和分析。研究结果表明,在不同补贴方式下,制造商将根据市场竞争环境和补贴投入的变化情况采取不同的定价策略。政府针对消费者的补贴可以使技术水平相对落后的制造商获得更高利润,促使更多的制造商进入新能源汽车产业。对制造商的补贴可以使较高技术水平的制造商获得更高利润,从而促进新能源汽车产业的优胜劣汰。政府补贴主体应由消费者逐步转向制造商,通过政策引导制造商和消费者进一步增进其对新能源汽车质量的重视程度,推动新能源汽车产业的良性发展。 The New Energy Vehicle industry of China is still in the stage of"Technical and Commercial Demonstration",and government subsidy is an important way to promote the development of New Energy Vehicle industry.Based on the perspective of government intervention of different subsidy bodies,the research on the optimal pricing game strategy of New Energy Vehicle manufacturers can not only promote the government to play a more incentive role with limited financial resources,but also obtain the market operation mechanism under the circumstance of subsidies,so as to improve the development of New Energy Vehicle Industry.According to different subsidy bodies,this paper divides the subsidy policy into manufacturers’subsidy and consumers’subsidy.Assuming there exist price and quality substitute in the products produced by two New Energy Vehicle manufacturers with different technical levels,"price substitute rate"and"quality substitute rate"are introduced to depict the market competition environment.Stackelberg game model is established to describe the influence of government policy and consumer preference on the pricing decision of New Energy Vehicle manufacturers by numerical simulation,which helps get the manufacturer’s Pareto optimal decision and propose policy recommendations.The results show that in the current stage of New Energy Vehicle industry,it’s necessary to advocate government subsidies in terms of accelerating the development of New Energy Vehicle industry.Exposed to different subsidies,manufacturers can adopt different pricing strategies to cope with the changes in the market competition environment.Among all subsidies,manufacturers adopt different pricing strategies to cope with the changing competition environment of market.Among them,the quality competition is more conducive for the development of leading manufacturers,and so is price competition to the development of following manufacturers.However,the impact of price competition on manufacturer profits is obviously stronger than that of quality competition.And if consumers pay too much attention to price,it will lead to The Market for Lemons easily.The government should choose different subsidy bodies according to different policy goals.A subsidy for consumers is to raise the price of products so that manufacturers that are started late,smaller,and backward in technology will gain higher profits.It will promote more manufacturers to enter the new energy automotive industry to prevent monopoly.A subsidy for manufacturers is to reduce the product price,and the higher-quality manufacturers can obtain higher profits to encourage manufacturers to increase research and development in order to improve the product quality and guide more consumers to buy high-quality New Energy Vehicles,promoting the survival of the fittest of the New Energy Vehicle industry.The main body of government subsidies should gradually shift from consumers to manufacturers and increase investment,especially in research and development investment for leading New Energy Vehicle manufacturers.Policies can play a part on guiding manufacturers and consumers to attach great importance to improve the quality of New Energy Vehicles and reduce their sensitivity to price so as to promote the healthy development of New Energy Vehicle industry.
作者 熊勇清 李小龙 黄恬恬 XIONG Yong-qing;LI Xiao-long;HUANG Tian-tian(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)
机构地区 中南大学商学院
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2020年第8期139-147,共9页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71473276,71874208)。
关键词 新能源汽车制造商 补贴主体 STACKELBERG博弈 可替代性 New Energy Vehicle manufacturers subsidy bodies Stackelberg game substitutability
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