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软钉住还是两极化:汇率制度演进中被淡忘的事实与解释 被引量:2

Soft Pegs or Polarization:The Forgotten Facts and Empirical Explanations during the Exchange Rate Regime Evolution
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摘要 本文通过识别汇率制度演进中所特有的状态依存特征,对“特殊两极化现象”给出新解释。研究发现:真实状态依存的主要估计结果部分解释了特殊两极化现象;重要解释变量的主要估计结果虽与经典理论相悖,但与特殊两极化现象具有内在一致性;由于经济运行存在摩擦和扭曲,非发达经济体为提高宏观经济政策的有效性,会在资本管制放松过程中稳定名义汇率水平,并倾向于选择非弹性汇率制度;软钉住汇率制度在一定条件下具有较高可维持性和稳定经济的作用,中国2015年“8.11汇改”以来逐步增强人民币汇率稳定性的政策调整有内在合理性。本文认为人民币汇率改革顺序不应完全参照发达经济体的理论和经验,应根据中国经济、金融发展的状况具体决定。 This paper provides a new empirical explanation of the forgotten“special polarization phenomenon”,identifying the unique state dependent characteristics of the exchange rate regime evolution.The study finds that the main results of estimating true state dependence may partly explain the special phenomenon of polarization.Although the main results in estimating significant explanatory variables contradict classical theories,they are intrinsically consistent with the special polarization phenomenon.Due to economic friction and distortion,in order to improve the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies,policy makers in less developed economies tend to choose less-flexible exchange rate regimes with increased capital account openness.The paper illustrates the rationality of China's policy adjustments in gradually improving the RMB exchange rate stability by adopting the managed floating exchange rate regime within the framework of the 2015“8.11 exchange rate regime reform”.In line with the above findings,this paper not only draws a series of vitally important conclusions,but also provides enlightenment and policy implications.
作者 路继业 张冲 张娆 Lu Jiye;Zhang Chong;Zhang Rao
出处 《世界经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第8期54-74,共21页 The Journal of World Economy
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目(18YJA790059) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573035) 国家社科基金一般项目(18BGL085)的资助。
关键词 汇率制度选择 两极化现象 状态依存 多元离散选择模型 exchange rate regime choice the bipolar view state dependence multinomial logit(MNL)model
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