面向竞争型零售商的商业信用融资决策研究

Research on trade credit strategies for competitive retailers

在含有一个供应商和两个Cournot竞争型零售商的供应链框架下,研究了零售商资金约束时的供应链商业信用融资策略。针对一个零售商的资金受到约束和两个零售商的资金同时受到约束两种情形,分别给出了商业信用合同中供应商的产品批发价Pareto区间,使得供应链中各企业达到共赢。数值分析结果表明:商业信用可以改善零售商的资金困境,但受市场竞争环境的影响,不能实现无资金约束情形时的均衡利润。而作为供应链的主导者,供应商可以从商业信贷中获得基于零售商无资金约束时的利润,并且,随着零售商之间竞争程度的加剧和自有资金的增多,商业信用的融资效用将逐渐减弱。

Trade credit(i.e.,deferred payment)is a common financing service that suppliers use to accommodate for the constraints of downstream retailers'funds.In practice,suppliers tend to sell the same product through different sales channels in order to increase product market share,which directly leads to competition among retailers.This paper mainly focuses on how suppliers provide trade credit financing services for capital-constrained retailers,given the market competition they face.This paper considers that,in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers in Cournot competition,the supplier is the Stackelberg game leader and each retailer is a follower.The optimal trade credit financing strategy is given for the case of a single retailer's capital constraint,in the situation that both retailers are simultaneously constrained by funds.Moreover,the Pareto interval of the supplier's wholesale price is given-enabling the companies in the supply chain to achieve a win-win situation-as well as the impact of the retailer's own funds and competition on the financing efficiency.The research conclusions are as follows:(1)When a single retailer is constrained by funds,trade credit can lead funds to constrain retailers and reduce the order quantity,but cannot allow both retailers to achieve the optimal order quantity and balanced profit without capital constraints.For well-funded retailers,the other party's financial constraints can expand their market share,regardless of whether the other party is willing to adopt a trade credit financing model,and sufficient funds can win retailers the growth in market demand for products,thereby generating a profit.The wholesale price of the supplier in the credit contract is inversely proportional to the financing rate,and the optimal profit can be obtained if the retailer has no capital constraints.(2)When both retailers are constrained by funds,trade credit can expand the purchase volume of retailers,but cannot allow both retailers to achieve the optimal order quantity and balanced profit without concurrent capital constraints.The wholesale price in the credit contract depends on the financing rate.If the supplier tries to obtain the optimal profit without financial constraints from the trade credit process,this will lead to at least one retailer not being able to obtain a balanced profit without capital constraints.(3)In order to achieve a win-win situation for all parties in the supply chain,the supplier can set the Pareto interval of the wholesale price,thus achieving the Pareto optimal profit of the upstream and downstream enterprises.With the increasing competition between retailers and the gradual increase of retailers'own funds,the Pareto interval of wholesale prices will gradually shrink;that is,the financing efficiency of trade credit will gradually decline.