摘要
我国职业年金投资体制随机关事业单位养老保险制度改革同步建立,采取了"代理-受托"治理结构、"虚账运行"账户管理、"多计划统一收益率"利益分配方式,潜藏管理效率风险、制度财务风险和个人利益风险。量化评估发现,因为"多计划统一收益率",高风险偏好计划成员可能面临数倍的投资收益损失;"虚账运行"能够减轻改革初期的财政负担,具有现实性,但当工资增长率降至4%,记账利率超过5.5%,"虚账运行"下职业年金制度存在净损失,当记账利率超过7.8%,"虚账运行"财政负担超过不改革情况。针对造成这些风险的原因,本文提出了完善职业年金投资体制的四项政策建议。
China′s occupational annuity investment system was established simultaneously with the reform of the pension system in public sectors,adopting the"agent-fiduciary"governance structure,"nominal accounting"management,and"multi-plan unified rate of return"benefit distribution mechanism.The mechanism has potential risks such as management efficiency risks,institutional accounting risks and individual interest risks.The quantitative analysis finds that,because of the"unified rate of return for multiple plans",members with higher risk preference may bear several times the loss of investment income.Furthermore,even though"nominal accounting"helps to reduce fiscal burden at the initial stage of reform,therefore,is a practical choice,when the wage growth rate drops to 4%and the accrued interest rate exceeds 5.5%,there will be a net loss in the occupational annuity system under"nominal accounting";when the accrued interest rate exceeds 7.8%,the fiscal burden of the system will exceed the pre-reform level.According to the causes of these risks,this paper put forward four policy suggestions for improving the investment system of the occupational annuity.
作者
张盈华
卢昱昕
ZHANG Ying-hua;LU Yu-xin
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第7期16-30,共15页
Insurance Studies
关键词
机关事业单位
职业年金
治理结构
虚账
记账利率
government departments and public institutions
occupational annuity
governance structure
nominal accounting
accrued interest rate