高管超额薪酬与企业会计信息可比性——基于薪酬辩护理论视角

Excessive Compensation of Senior Executives and Accounting Information Comparability:A View of Compensation Justification Theory

基于薪酬辩护理论,文章考察了中国上市公司高管超额薪酬是否会影响其信息披露动机,进而导致对外公开披露会计信息可比性水平的变化。研究发现,高管超额薪酬水平越高,企业会计信息可比性越低;区分产权性质后发现,国有企业高管超额薪酬与会计信息可比性没有显著相关关系,非国有企业高管超额薪酬与会计信息可比性具有显著的负相关关系。进一步研究发现,具有公司治理功能的机构投资者持股、分析师跟踪可以有效抑制非国有企业高管超额薪酬对会计信息可比性的负向影响。

Based on the theory of compensation justification,this paper examines whether excessive compensation of senior executives of listed firms in China affects their information disclosure motivation,and thus leads to the change of the comparable level of accounting information disclosed publicly.The result shows that the higher the level of excessive compensation of senior executives,the lower the accounting information comparability,and this negative relationship is(not)significant in(state-owned)non-stateowned firms after distinguishing the nature of property right.Further study finds that institutional investors and analysts tracking,which play a role in corporate governance can effectively restrain the negative effect of excessive compensation of senior executives in non-state-owned firms on the accounting information comparability.