摘要
使用演化博弈研究方法解释技术标准演化的动态过程,预测市场均衡将会到达什么状态以及如何到达。研究结论如下:(1)技术标准的兼容性越强,产品让渡价值在竞争中的作用就越大;兼容性越弱,网络效用在竞争中的作用就越大。(2)引起市场演化的总效应可以分为增长效应与竞争效应,在市场增长阶段,增长效应起主导作用;在市场饱和阶段,竞争效应起主导作用。(3)当两种技术的让渡价值相差很大且兼容性很强时,具有较大让渡价值的技术总是抢夺竞争对手的用户,不论市场的初始状态如何,具有较大让渡价值的技术都将会占领市场。(4)当两种技术的让渡价值相差不大而兼容性较弱时,初始状态占优的技术会抢夺竞争对手的用户,初始状态的优劣由让渡价值与兼容性共同决定。
In this paper,the evolutionary game theory is used to explain the dynamic process of technical standard evolution and to predict where the market equilibrium will go as well as how it will go there.The research conclusions are as follows:(1)The greater the compatibility,the greater the role of delivered value in competition;conversely,network utility plays a bigger role.(2)The overall effect of market evolution can be divided into growth effect and competition effect.In the stage of market growth,growth effect plays the leading role;in the stage of market saturation,competition effect plays the leading role.(3)When delivered values of two technologies are greatly different and the compatibility is strong,the technology with a greater delivered value always grabs the users of competitors,no matter what the initial state of the market is,the technology with a greater delivered value will occupy the market.(4)When delivered values of two technologies are not much different and the compatibility is weak,the technology in the initial state with advantages will grab the users of competitors,and the advantages and disadvantages of the initial state are determined by the delivered value and compatibility.
作者
杜玉申
刘梓毓
Du Yushen;Liu Ziyu(Research Centre for Quantitative Economics,Jilin University;Business School,Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第16期175-183,共9页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学基金项目“基于社会网络分析方法的企业网络结构对收益分配影响研究”(16YJA630008)。
关键词
技术标准
标准竞争
演化博弈
兼容性
technical standard
standard competition
evolutionary game
compatibility