非处罚性监管能预测公司违规吗?

Can the Non-penalty Regulation Predict Corporate Fraud?

基于中国证券交易所发布的财务报告问询函对非处罚性监管是否能有效预测公司违规进行分析。研究表明,财务报告问询函对公司违规具有正向的预测作用,且能够提高收函公司未来财务违规稽查的可能性。进一步渠道分析发现,问询函对公司违规被稽查的预测效果在信息不对称程度越高、公司治理环境越差的公司中更为显著。此外,问询函细分特征也会显著影响公司违规的预测效果。非处罚性监管机制对于公司违规行为具有前瞻性预测作用,研究对上市公司和监管机构治理及防范公司违规具有借鉴意义。

Based on the financial report inquiry letters issued by the China Stock Exchange,this paper analyzes whether the non-penalty regulation can effectively predict corporate fraud.The empirical results indicate that the financial report inquiry letter has a positive predictive effect on the company's violations and can improve the possibility of companies receiving inquiry letters to be detected for financial fraud.Further channel analysis shows that the prediction effect of inquiry letters is more significant in companies with higher degree of information asymmetry and worse corporate governance environment.In addition,the detailed characteristics of the inquiry letters significantly affect the prediction effect of corporate fraud.Hence,the non-penalty regulation mechanism has a forward-looking prediction effect on the company's violations and provides reference for listed companies and regulatory agencies in the governance and prevention of corporate fraud.