摘要
供应链中各成员企业的权力是不对等的,权力大小会影响企业的运作管理,权力(控制力)在不同成员企业之间的合理分配对供应链的稳定十分重要。为探究控制力因素对生鲜品供应链定价与绩效的影响,针对单个供应商和零售商组成的二级生鲜品供应链,构建了3种博弈模型:集中决策模型、供应商主导的分散决策模型、零售商主导的分散决策模型。将零售价格视为控制力的函数、控制力为[0,1]区间内取值的内生变量,并考虑零售价格和保鲜努力对需求的共同影响,构建了确定性环境下生鲜品市场需求函数。随后,借助数学优化和逆向归纳求解供应链最优定价决策和绩效水平。最后,通过算例仿真,对比分析了3种模型的绩效水平。结果表明:控制力会影响供应链定价与绩效水平;不论是分散决策还是集中决策,最优零售价格取决于不同运作环境下的控制力水平大小;集中决策下供应链绩效水平最大,分散决策下谁对系统拥有控制权,谁的绩效越高,但控制力水平不是越大越好,满足一定条件时,存在最优的控制力水平使得系统绩效最大;针对生鲜品的销售,集中决策系统绩效最优,要求的保鲜投入水平也最高,供应商主导的分散决策系统绩效水平大于零售商主导的分散决策系统绩效水平,且供应商主导下保鲜努力水平也较大。
The power of each member enterprise in the supply chain is not equal and can affect the operation and management of the enterprise.The reasonable distribution of power(control power)among different members is very important for the stability of the supply chain.In order to explore the influence of control power on the pricing and performance of fresh product supply chain,3 game models(centralized decisionmaking model,decentralized decision-making models dominated by supplier and retailer)for a 2-stage fresh product supply chain composed of a single supplier and a retailer are established.Taking the retail price as a function of control power which is an endogenous variable with a value range of[0,1],and considering the common influence of retail price and fresh keeping effort on demand,the market demand function of fresh products under the deterministic environment is constructed.Then,the optimal pricing decision and performance level of supply chain are solved by mathematical optimization and reverse induction.Finally,the performance levels of the 3 models is compared and analyzed through example simulation.The result shows that(1)Control power will affect the pricing and performance level of supply chain.(2)Whether decentralized or centralized decision-making,the optimal retail price depends on the control power level under different operating environments.(3)The supply chain performance level is the largest under centralized decision-making,while under decentralized decision-making,whoever has control of the system has higher performance,but the control power level is not the greater the better.There is an optimal control level to maximize the system performance under certain conditions.(4)For the sale of fresh products,the centralized decision-making system has the best performance,and the required fresh-keeping investment level is also the highest.The performance of decentralized decision-making led by suppliers is higher than that led by retailers,and the level of fresh-keeping effort led by suppliers is also higher.
作者
张艳
王淑云
ZHANG Yan;WANG Shu-yun(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology Tianjin 300401,China;School of Economics and Management,Yantai University,Yantai Shandong 264005,China)
出处
《公路交通科技》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第9期139-147,共9页
Journal of Highway and Transportation Research and Development
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71672166,71372122)
山东省社会科学规划研究项目(17CKJJ11)。
关键词
运输经济
控制力
Stackberg博弈模型
供应链绩效
保鲜努力
生鲜品
transport economics
control power
Stackberg game model
supply chain performance
freshness-keeping effort
fresh product