考虑随机市场需求和不同博弈地位的双渠道供应链策略分析

A Strategic Analysis of Dual-channel Supply Chain with Stochastic Market Demand and Different Game Status

为研究供应链成员不同博弈地位下双渠道定价及随机库存问题,分别构建制造商主导、零售商主导及双方同等博弈地位的双渠道供应链博弈模型,考察随机市场需求对定价、库存及利润的影响,分析具有不同博弈地位的供应链策略差异,并通过数值仿真探讨最佳响应策略。结果表明,主导方凭借地位优势拥有更强的价格把控权及库存调配能力,获得更高收益;制造商主导型供应链具有更强的渠道整合能力,供应链的整体利润水平高于零售商主导型;同等博弈地位情形的博弈双方可根据共同市场信息及竞争对手策略更新自身策略,具有较低的库存风险,渠道定价越低,但双重边际效应降低了双方收益;市场需求波动越大,渠道定价、库存量及供应链利润均越大,此时主导方利润增幅大于追随者。

In order to study the dual-channel pricing and stochastic inventory problems under different game status of supply chain members,a game model dominated by manufacturers,retailers and equal players is constructed to investigate the impact of stochastic market demand on pricing,inventory and profit.The strategy differences of supply chain with different game status are analyzed,and the optimal response strategy is explored through numerical simulation.The results show that the dominant party has stronger price control and inventory allocation ability to obtain higher income through its position advantage.The manufacturer-led supply chain has stronger channel integration capabilities,and the overall profit of supply chain is higher than that of retailer-led.Both players in the same game status situation can update their strategies according to common market information and competitor strategies,and thus obtain lower inventory risks and channel pricing,but the double marginal effect reduces the benefits of both parties.The higher the fluctuation of market demand,the larger the channel pricing,inventory and supply chain profits,and the profit growth of dominant party is greater than that of followers.