信息不对称下零售商销售延保服务的产品服务供应链激励契约设计

Incentive contract design for product service supply chain with extended warranty sold by retailer under asymmetric information

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的产品服务供应链(其中制造商生产产品并提供延保服务,零售商销售产品和延保服务,零售商的延保服务销售努力程度为其私有信息),建立了制造商和零售商之间的委托代理模型,研究产品与延保服务的定价策略及制造商的激励契约设计问题,分析了产品故障率、延保服务成本等因素对均衡结果的影响,以及信息不对称对企业价格决策和产品服务供应链系统利润的影响。结果表明:制造商和零售商应根据信息条件和销售努力类型调整延保服务批发价格和销售价格;零售商的信息优势并不总是产生信息租金;零售商促销努力程度与制造商利润的正相关关系受到产品故障率的影响;信息不对称并不一定对供应链系统利润产生不利影响。

This paper focuses on a product service supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer,in which the manufacturer makes products and provides extended warranty,the retailer sells products and extended warranty,and the sales effort is the retailer’s private information.A principal-agent model between the manufacturer and the retailer is built to study the pricing strategy of products and extended warranty service,as well as the incentive contract design problem of the manufacturer.The influences of product failure rate,extended warranty cost and other factors on the equilibrium results are analyzed.The influences of information asymmetry on price decision of the enterprises and the profit of entire supply chain system are also discussed.The results show that the manufacturer and retailer should adjust the wholesale price and selling price of the extended warranty service according to the information condition and sales effort.The retailer’s information advantage does not always generate information rents.The positive correlation between the retailer’s promotional effort and the manufacturer’s profit is affected by the product failure rate.Information asymmetry does not necessarily have a negative impact on the profit of the supply chain system.