摘要
研究单个制造商、分销商以及零售商组成的制造商双渠道三级供应链。通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型并进行KKT求解,刻画扰动前后集中决策下供应链的最优生产和定价决策,以及分散决策下数量折扣和收益共享组合契约协调供应链的条件。研究结果表明:原有的生产计划具有鲁棒性;数量折扣和收益共享组合契约可以协调扰动后的双渠道三级供应链;组合契约具有鲁棒性和抗突发事件能力。
The paper exploresa dual-channel three-Level supply chain of manufacturers from a single manufacturer,distributor,and retailer. By establishing the Stackelberg game model and solving KKT,the optimal production and pricing decisions of the supply chain under the centralized decision before and after disturbance are described,and the conditions of quantity discount and coordination supply chain of revenue sharing portfolio contract under decentralized decision is also studied. The research results show that the original production plan is robust. The quantity discount and revenue sharing portfolio contract can coordinate the dual-channel three-level supply chain after the disturbance. The combined contract is robust and resistant to emergencies.
作者
经有国
刘震
秦开大
JING You-guo;LIU Zhen;QIN Kai-da(Faculty of Management and Economics,Klunming University of Science and Technology,Kunming 650093,China)
出处
《系统科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期96-100,共5页
Chinese Journal of Systems Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71461014)
国家自然科学基金(71362025)。
关键词
双渠道
三级供应链
需求扰动
成本扰动
dual channel
three-level supply chain
demand disruption
cost disruption