基于不完美信息动态博弈的企业风险处置研究--以S省为例

Enterprise Risk Disposal Based on Dynamic Game of Imperfect Information--Taking S Province as an Example

随着我国经济下行压力加大、产业转型升级加速,企业风险暴露与处置成为当前维护金融稳定面临的一项重要任务。通过构建基于不完美信息下的三方动态博弈模型,总结了银企双方博弈和银政企三方博弈下的六种情况。随后,按照整体债务重组、分拆债务重组、整体破产重整、分拆破产重整、破产清算等五种处置模式筛选出S省5家典型企业,运用博弈模型对其进行了详尽分析。结果显示,企业积极配合是银企博弈达到最优解的基本前提,银行合理救助是银企博弈达到最优解的重要保障,政府及时介入是化解银企博弈困境的最终屏障,应从企业、银行、政府三个维度提高企业风险处置效率。

With the increasing downward pressure in China’s economy and the acceleration of industrial transformation and upgrading,corporation risk exposure and resolution have become an important task for maintaining financial stability.This paper constructs a three-party dynamic game model based on imperfect information,and summarizes six situations in the game between“bank and corporation”and the three-party game between“bank,corporation and government”.Subsequently,five typical enterprises in S province were screened out according to five disposal modes--overall debt reorganization,split debt reorganization,overall bankruptcy reorganization,split bankruptcy reorganization and bankruptcy liquidation,and analyzed them in detail using game models.The analysis results show that the active cooperation of corporation is the basic prerequisite for the optimal solution of the bank-enterprise game.Reasonable bank assistance is an important guarantee for the bank-enterprise game to reach the optimal solution.The timely intervention of the government is the ultimate barrier to resolve the bank-enterprise game dilemma.The efficiency of enterprise risk handling should be improved from the three dimensions of corporation,bank and government.