摘要
以数据为主要驱动力的平台经济模式天生带有“垄断基因”。获得数据垄断地位的优势平台企业在市场竞争中有能力实施强制不兼容、市场挤出、不正当数字定价、减损隐私等不正当竞争行为,但数据竞争的独特性质使得传统基于价格理论的竞争法架构难以对平台数据垄断进行有效因应。对此可以考虑在《个人信息保护法》的制定过程中引入数据可携带权,通过个人数据的可迁移性破除优势平台的数据锁定。不过,域外数据可携带权“全有全无”的运行模式“刚性过强”,将导致大小平台之间不成比例的合规成本和“搭便车”现象,因此,有必要从平台规模和数据用途两方面对数据可携带权进行细化标定,以实现数据利益与竞争活力之间的平衡。
Mainly motivated by data,the platform economy is born with a“monopoly gene”.The dominant platform enterprises can implement unfair competition behaviors such as forced incompatibility,market crowding out,improper digital pricing,and hurting privacy.However,traditional competition law,which is based on price theory,can’t properly deal with data monopoly.During the legislative process of Personal Information Protection Law,we can consider introducing the right of data portability and break the dominant platform’s data lock through the transferability of personal data.However,the“all-or-nothing”operating mode is“too rigid”and will lead to disproportionate compliance costs between large and small platforms and“free riders”.Therefore,to achieve a balance between data benefits and competitive vitality,it is necessary to refine the data portability in terms of platform size and data usage.
作者
袁昊
Yuan Hao(School of Law,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
出处
《西北民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2020年第5期81-91,共11页
Journal of Northwest Minzu University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)