非处罚性监管会影响商业信用融资吗?——基于年报问询函的经验证据

Does Non-punitive Regulation Affect Trade Credit Financing?--Evidence from the Annual Report Inquiry Letter

本文以2014~2017年我国A股主板上市公司为样本,采用双重差分模型(DID)研究交易所年报问询函这一非处罚性监管方式对上市公司商业信用融资的影响。结果表明,收到年报问询函后,上市公司的商业信用融资规模显著下降;在问询函严重程度较高、涉及“关键问题”或“关键词汇”、上市公司缺乏产品市场竞争优势、面临较低融资约束的情况下,年报问询函对商业信用融资的负面影响显著。进一步研究表明,在被问询比例较高的行业中,若同行业其他上市公司被问询,则行业内未被问询上市公司的商业信用融资规模也会随之下降。本文的研究结果证明,上市公司商业信用的提供者会考虑年报问询函的影响。因此,年报问询函作为重要的非处罚性监管方式,具有一定的风险警示作用。

Using a sample of A-share main board listed companies from 2014 to 2017,this article attempts to analyze the influence of the annual report inquiry letter on trade credit financing of the listed company using the DID model.The results show that after receiving the annual report inquiry letter,the scale of commercial credit financing will drop significantly,and when the inquiry letter is of high severity,involving"key issues"or"key words",lacking competitive advantage,facing lower level of financing constraints,the negative impact of the annual report inquiry letter on commercial credit financing will be revealed.Further research shows that after receiving the annual report inquiry letter,the scale of commercial credit financing of other companies in the same industry will also drop significantly,and the decline exists only in industries with a high proportion of inquiry letters.Our research shows that,when providing commercial credit,the inquiry letters will be considered.As an important way of non-punitive supervision,the annual report inquiry letters play a certain degree of risk warning role.