摘要
业绩承诺是一项中国特色的上市公司并购重组制度。为了保障其作用的有效发挥,监管部门出台了系列管理规定,对规范业绩承诺行为起到了良好作用,但也存在着处罚力度偏低、监管效率偏低、核实手段缺失等问题,需要进一步改进完善。本文从监管的中心思想、监管的层次体系、监管的执行情况等入手,最后得出基本结论并给出政策建议。
Performance commitment is an M&A and restructuring arrangement with Chinese characteristics for the listed companies.In order to ensure its effectiveness,the regulatory authorities have issued a series of regulations,which have played a good role in standardizing it.However,there arc still some problems,such as weak punishment,low supervision efficiency and lack of verification means,which need to be further improved.This paper starts with the central idea of supervision,the level of suj^ervision and the implementation of supervision,and finally draws the basic conclusions and gives policy suggestions.
出处
《学术前沿》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第16期124-127,共4页
Frontiers
关键词
上市公司
并购重组
业缋承诺
监管机制
listed companies
M&A and restructuring
performance commitment
supervision mechanism