考虑信息泄露的零售商需求预测信息共享研究

Retailer’s Demand Forecasting Information Sharing Considering Information Leakage

针对信息泄露导致零售商信息共享意愿降低的问题,基于竞争型制造商创新的视角,构建了考虑信息泄露的零售商需求预测信息共享模型,求解了供应链各主体的均衡决策,分析了信息泄露对零售商信息共享的影响。研究发现:虽然需求预测信息泄露能够增加两个竞争型制造商的创新投入,但会削弱博弈主导制造商的领导者优势。上游竞争型供应链中的信息泄露会削弱下游零售商的事前利润,零售商的信息共享价值降低。本文克服了Shamir关于供应链需求信息泄露局限于零售商的不足,并进一步考虑了制造商之间的竞争和创新。

Focused on the reduction of retailers’information sharing willingness caused by information leakage,retailer’s demand forecasting information sharing model is constructed based on competing manufacturer’s innovation investment.Equilibrium decisions of each party are solved,and the impact of information leakage on retailer’s information sharing is analyzed.It finds that while demand forecasting information leakage can increase the innovation investment of two competing manufacturers,it will undermine the position of game-leading manufacturer.The information leakage in the upstream competing supply chain will undermine the ex ante profit of the downstream retailer and reduce the value of the retailer’s information sharing.This article overcomes the shortcomings of Shamir about the supply chain information leakage that is limited to retailers,and further takes into account the competition and innovation of manufacturers.