基于混合产品提供的后市场知识共享激励机制设计研究

Research on the Design of Post-market Knowledge Sharing Incentive Mechanism Based on Hybrid Offerings

制造企业对混合产品专有知识出于盈利与保护目的封锁行为,将使得供需之间产生知识缺口。在厘清缺口形成原因的基础上,分别构建了不同信息条件及不同风险偏好下的供需知识共享激励模型。研究结果表明:在信息对称的条件下,供需双方可达到帕累托最优,客户可通过买断知识产权或建立知识联盟共享企业混合产品的专有知识;而信息不对称的情形下,制造企业采取知识授权的形式进行共享,客户提高收益分配比例对保护性知识的共享边际作用递增,而对盈利性知识的共享边际作用保持不变;考虑知识泄露的风险,仿真发现制造企业愿意承担的风险比例对保护性知识的共享成本系数的敏感性要高于盈利性知识。

The blockade of manufacturing enterprises’proprietary knowledge of hybrid offerings for profit and protection purposes will create a knowledge gap between supply and demand.On the basis of clarifying the reasons for the knowledge gap,this paper constructs the model of supply and demand knowledge sharing incentive mechanism under different information conditions and different risk preferences.This result shows that the supply and demand can reach the Pareto optimal under the condition of symmetric market information,and the customers can share the knowledge of hybrid offerings by buying out intellectual property or building knowledge alliances.In the case of asymmetric market information,manufacturing enterprises often share knowledge in the form of knowledge authorization.The increase in the proportion of income distribution of the manufacturing enterprises by the customer can increase the marginal effect of the sharing of protective knowledge,but the marginal effect of the sharing of profitable knowledge remains unchanged.Considering the risk of knowledge leakage,the numerical analysis shows that the proportion of risk that the manufacturing enterprises is willing to bear is more sensitive to the shared cost coefficient of protective knowledge than the profitable knowledge.