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政策激励下农业产业链纵向协作的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Vertical Cooperation of Agricultural Chain under Incentive Policies
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摘要 目前,在农业产业链纵向协作模式中,订单农业模式占据主要地位,而农业企业与农户之间的高违约率限制了农业产业链的稳定发展。因此,基于政府的政策激励,通过构建复制动态模型,分析订单农业主体履约情况对农业产业链发展有重大意义。结果表明,双方同时违约和同时履约都是稳定的均衡点。积极完善各项激励政策,加深农业企业与农户的合作程度,可趋向于理想的稳定均衡点,即双方积极履行合同,实现政府制定政策的目标。 At present,in the vertical cooperation mode of agricultural chain,the contract agriculture mode occupies the main position,and the high default rate between agricultural enterprises and farmers restricts the stable development of agricultural chain.In this paper,based on the government's incentive policies,through the construction of a replication dynamic model to analyze the performance of main bodies in contract agriculture.The results show that there are two equilibrium points,which both bodies keep a contract and break a contract.In addition,we should actively improve the incentive policies and deepen the cooperation between agricultural enterprises and farmers,which will tend to an ideal stable equilibrium point,that both bodies actively perform the contract,which achieve the goal of the government's policy-making.
作者 韩兰华 潘荣根 汪桥 HAN Lan-hua;PAN Rong-gen;WANG Qiao(College of Economic and Management, Chuzhou University, Chuzhou 239000, China)
出处 《信阳农林学院学报》 2020年第3期37-40,共4页 Journal of Xinyang Agriculture and Forestry University
基金 滁州学院“小岗村专项”项目(2019xgc05) 安徽高校科学重点研究项目(SK2019A0451).
关键词 政策激励 农业产业链 纵向协作 演化博弈 incentive policies agricultural chain vertical cooperation evolutionary game
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