具零售服务下制造商回收闭环供应链的应急决策及契约协调研究

Study on Contingency Decision and Contract Coordination of Manufacturer Recovery Closed-loop Supply Chain with Retail Service

针对突发事件导致产品的生产成本和市场需求发生干扰的,构建了制造商负责闭环供应链系统回收活动的模型,设计收益费用共享契约协调突发事件干扰下的闭环供应链。研究表明,在制造商回收系统和集中式决策系统中,闭环供应链企业在生产成本和市场需求干扰程度较小时不需要改变原有的计划,但是应该随着市场需求变化方向适时调节产品的销售价和批发价;当产品的需求和成本的综合扰动力度较大,应随市场需求扰动方向同时调整产品的批发价、销售价、销售量和废旧品的回收率;当需求减少和成本增加的综合扰动程度很大,制造商回收系统和集中式决策系统会被破坏;在其他扰动情况下,可以利用应急收益费用共享契约协调解决制造商回收系统中存在的“双重边际效应”问题,协调突发事件干扰下的闭环供应链,使得协调后的供应链各企业获得的利润获得帕累托改进。

Under the circumstance that emergency caused the production cost and market demand of the product to be disturbed,a model for the manufacturer's responsibility for the recycling activity of the closed-loop supply chain system was constructed,and the revenue-expense sharing contract was designed to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain under the disturbance of emergency.In the manufacturers recycling system and centralized decision-making system,the supply chain company didn't need to change the original plan when the production cost and market demand were less clisruptive.Insteacl,the sales price and wholesale price of product should be adjusted in a timely manner as the market demand changes.When the comprehensive interference of product demand and cost was relatively large,the wholesale price,sales price,sales volume and recovery rate of waste product should be adjusted according to the direction of market demand disturbance.When the overall interference of product demand decreases and cost increases was greater,the manufacturer's recycling system and centralized decision-making system would be destroyed.In addition,in other disturbance situations,the"double marginal effect",problem in the manufacturers recovery system could be solved through the sharing contract of emergency revenue and expense,and the closed-loop supply chain under the interference of emergency could be coordinated,so that the profit by each coordinated supply chain company could be improved by Pareto.