连锁董事网络、融资约束与民营企业社会责任

Interlocking Directorate Networks,Financial Constraints and the Social Responsibility of Private Enterprises

基于多理论视角,借助社会网络分析法和多元回归技术,分析并检验了连锁董事网络对企业社会责任的影响效应、作用路径和边界条件。研究表明:①当连锁董事处于网络中心或占据结构洞位置时,有助于促进企业社会责任履行。②当连锁董事处于网络中心或占据结构洞位置时,有利于减轻融资约束;融资约束在连锁董事网络中心度和结构洞影响企业社会责任的过程中,发挥部分中介作用。③政治关联强化了连锁董事网络对企业社会责任的正向影响。进一步研究发现,与地方政治关联相比,中央政治关联对连锁董事网络与社会责任关系的影响更大;代表委员型政治关联强化了连锁董事网络与企业社会责任之间的正相关关系,但官员型政治关联对二者关系的影响并不显著。

Based on a multiple theory perspective,this study uses social network analysis to examine the influence of interlocking directorate networks on the corporate social responsibility(CSR)of private,entrepreneurial firms.Several results are noted.First,the interlocking directorates have a positive effect on CSR when they are in the center of social network or spanning structure holes.Second,interlocking networks(network centrality and structure hole)improve financial constraints,which in turn mediate the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and CSR.Third,political connections strengthen the influence of interlocking directorate networks on CSR.Finally,the political connections with the central government have much a stronger effect on the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and CSR than those with the local government.While political connections of“deputies to NPC”or“members ofCPPCC”enhance the influence of interlocking directorate networks on CSR,there is no significant moderating effect for official political connections on the relationship between interlocking directorate networks and CSR.