定向增发政策运行时间管理悖论--兼论非公开发行定价新政

The Paradox of Running Time Management of Private Placement Policy--On the New Policy of Non-public Issuing Pricing

我国定向增发相关政策文件近年来经历了多次修订;通过对历次修订的统计分析发现,监管层对不同类型的定向增发在审批时间上存在明显的倾向性:对于不符合当时政策发展方向的定向增发,审批时间相对更长。本文将这一金融管理手段与批文有效期一起称为定向增发政策运行时间管理,并结合发行折价的形成机制和期权的价值理论,探讨了这一管理手段对发行折价的影响。研究发现,以定价发行方式进行定向增发的上市公司的政策运行时间对其发行折价具有显著的正向影响,导致这一管理手段存在两个层面的悖论:在微观上给发行对象带来反向激励;在宏观上加剧我国定向增发高折价问题的严重性。该结论可为提高金融管理的科学性提供参考。

China's policies regarding private equity placements have undergone a number of revisions in recent years.We find that there is a clear tendency to different types of private equity placements by the statistical analysis on revision:for those who do not meet the direction of policy orientation,approval time is relatively long.This paper defines this financial management method together with the validity period of the approval document as the operation time management of the private placement policy,and discusses the influence of this management method on the issuance discount by combining the price formation mechanism of the private equity placements and the value theory of the option.It is found that the policy running time of listed companies has a significant positive impact on the issuance pricediscounts,which leads to two levels of paradox:bringing the reverse incentive for the issue object at the micro level;exacerbating the high issue-discount problem of private equity placements at the macro level.The conclusion can provide a reference for improving the scientific financial management.