摘要
本文考察了不同定价模式下大股东参与对定向增发折价的影响。研究发现,在定价发行模式下,大股东参与与定向增发折价正相关,这种正相关关系在公司治理环境较差的公司中更加显著;在询价发行模式下,大股东参与与定向增发折价负相关,这种负相关关系在信息不对称程度高的公司中更加显著。上述研究结果表明:只有在定价发行模式下,大股东才能够通过压低发行价格掏空上市公司;询价发行模式下,大股东参与向投资者传递了利好信号,有助于降低再融资成本。
This paper investigates the role of big shareholder in SEO pricing under different pricing mechanisms.For SEOs using fixedprice mechanism,the SEO discount is higher when big shareholders get involved and this relation is more pronounced for firms in a poor environment of corporate governance.In contrast,the discount for SEOs employing auction pricing mechanism is lower when big shareholders participate and this relation is stronger for more opaque firms.These results imply that big shareholders tunnel through suppressing offer price only under fixed-price mechanism.In auction pricing mechanism,big shareholder participation releases good signal and thus decreases SEO discount.
作者
王化成
刘金钊
高升好
卿小权
Wang Huacheng;Liu Jinzhao;Gao Shenghao;Qing Xiaoquan(School of Business,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872;School of Business,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044;School of Accounting,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070)
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第9期266-279,共14页
Management Review
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA073)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772173,71872010)
教育部人文社科基金项目(15YJC630102)
北京工商大学青年教师科研启动基金项目(QNJJ2020-42)。
