基于过度自信零售商的绿色供应链博弈模型

Green supply chain game model based on overconfident retailer

过度自信心理行为使得需求认知产生偏差,从而影响到各方的决策行为。针对由一个理性制造商和一个过度自信零售商构成的二级绿色供应链,通过Stackelberg博弈分析过度自信对产品绿色度、订货量及各方利润的影响。研究结果表明,集中决策时的订货量和绿色度水平要高于分散决策,且供应链总利润也大体上高于分散决策。分散决策时,当批发价较低时,零售商的订货量和制造商的绿色度水平均随着过度自信程度的增加而减小;当批发价较高时,零售商的订货量和制造商的绿色度水平均随着过度自信程度的增加而增加。

Overconfidence leads to the deviation of demand cognition,which affects the decision-making behavior of all parties.Taking the two-stage green supply chain with a rational manufacturer and an overconfident retailer as the research object,this paper uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze the impact of overconfidence on the product green level,order quantity and profits.The results show that the order quantity and green level of the centralized decision are higher than the decentralized decision,and the total supply chain profit is also higher than the decentralized decision.In the decentralized decision-making,the order quantity of retailer and the green level of manufacturer decrease as the degree of overconfidence increases while the wholesale price is low;the order quantity of retailer and the green level of manufacturer increase as the degree of overconfidence increases while the wholesale price is high.