零售电商业服务质量监管中的第三方认证博弈

Third-party Authentication Game in the Supervision of Retail Electric Commerce Service Quality

基于博弈论理论,构建零售电商服务质量监管中企业、第三方认证机构和消费者的非对称演化博弈模型及其动态复制方程,分析相关利益主体行为的演化稳定策略及各主体策略达到理想状态的稳定条件。研究利益主体的稳定策略发现,零售电商遵守认证监管的稳定策略与第三方认证机构带来的额外收益和消费者接受比例存在必然的联系;第三方机构监管的稳定策略与零售电商遵守认证监管标准的比例有关;零售电商、第三方认证机构与消费者形成的动态博弈系统中局部均衡点的稳定状态较少,且均衡策略点存在一定的帕累托改进。研究参与主体稳定策略的稳定性条件发现,机构在企业选择遵守策略后的外部收益和服务成本、企业在机构选择监管策略后的额外收益和第三方认证中的投入成本、消费者选择接受策略后承担的转嫁成本及从第三方认证交易获得的间接收益等是影响零售电商服务质量监管第三方认证博弈稳定性的关键因素。

Based on game theory,an asymmetric evolutionary game model and its dynamic replication equations for enterprises,third-party certification agencies and consumers in the supervision of retail e-commerce service quality were constructed,and the evolutionary and stable strategies of the behaviors of relevant stakeholders and the stable conditions for the strategies of each subject to reach the ideal state were analyzed.Research on the stability strategy of stakeholders found that the stability strategy of retail e-commerce s compliance with certification supervision is inextricably linked with the additional benefits brought by third-party certification agencies and consumer acceptance ratio.The stability strategy of third-party agency supervision is related to the proportion of retail e-commerce companies complying with certification supervision standards.In the dynamic game system formed by retail e-commerce,third-party certification agencies and consumers,the stability of the local equilibrium points is less,and the equilibrium strategy points have a certain Pareto improvement.Research on the stability conditions of the participants stabilization strategy found that the external benefits and service costs of the organization after the company chooses to comply with the strategy,the additional benefits of the company after the organization chooses the regulatory strategy and the input cost in the third-party certification,the transfer costs that consumers bear after accepting the strategy,and the indirect benefits obtained from third-party certification transactions were key factors that affect the stability of the third-party certification game of retail e-commerce service quality supervision.