控制链长度与国企混合所有制

The Length of Control Chain and Mixed Ownership of SOEs

针对当前如何增强国企主体活力、推动改革走深走实等问题,利用国有上市公司数据,探讨控制链长度对国企混合所有制的影响。研究发现:金字塔控制链延长提升了国企混合所有制程度;外部市场发展水平对混合所有制的作用与控制链延长的作用形成互补关系;机制检验表明,控制链延长通过提升投资者保护水平,提高了非国有资本参与混合所有制的积极性与预期收益,增强了其进入意愿,进而对改革起到促进作用。经济后果方面,混合所有制总体上有利于实现国有资产保值增值的改革目标,非国有股东委派董事更起到了强化作用,但过长控制链层级下的混合所有制对实现保值增值目标无明显作用。本文丰富了国企金字塔控制链与混合所有制的相关研究,提供了非国有股东权益保护对于推进国企混改、实现改革目标方面的经验证据。

This study investigates the relationship between the length of control chain and mixed ownership using data from SOEs.The result shows that the longer the control chain is,the higher the degree of mixed ownership of SOEs.Specifically,the effect of the level of external market development on mixed ownership is complementary to the effect of the extension of the control chain;the mechanism test shows that the extension of the control chain increases the incentive and expected return of non-state capital to participate in mixed ownership by increasing the level of investor protection.In terms of economic consequences,we find that the mixed ownership is generally beneficial to the goal of preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets.When non-state shareholders appoint directors,there is a reinforcing effect.However,excessively long control chains do not contribute significantly to the achievement of the goal.