政府补助、技术创新与企业绩效——基于A股上市公司的经验证据

Government Subsidy,Technological Innovation and Enterprise Performance: Empirical Evidence Based on A-share Listed Companies

政府支持对于企业技术创新和经营绩效的影响一直备受关注,但现有研究较少将三者置于同一框架内以探究其中的内在机理。以2012—2017年中国1 198家上市公司相关数据为样本,研究了政府补助、技术创新对企业绩效的影响效应、技术创新的中介效应、高管股权激励与股权集中度的情境效应。研究结果表明:(1)政府补助可以显著提升企业绩效,并且技术创新在其中发挥了部分中介作用;(2)高管股权激励不能正向调节政府研发补助与企业技术创新的关系,但可以正向调节企业技术创新与企业绩效的关系;(3)股权集中度在"政府补助—技术创新—企业绩效"的作用路径中,均起负向调节作用。对此,政府应进一步细化与完善补贴政策,制定对企业创新行为的甄选标准,确保使有限的资金发挥最大效益;企业应适当加强股权激励,提升高管人员的主动性和积极性,适当降低大股东持股比例,削弱大股东"侵占"中小股东利益的异化行为。

The influence of government support on enterprise technological innovation and business performance has been of great concern, but the existing research has not put government subsidies, technological innovation and enterprise performance into the same framework and rarely explored its internal mechanism. With the 2012-2017 data of 1198 China listed companies as sample, this paper studies the influence effect of government subsidies and technological innovation on enterprise performance, the mediating effect of technological innovation, and the situational effect of executive equity incentive and equity concentration. The results show that: a. Government subsidies can significantly improve enterprise performance, and technological innovation plays a partial intermediary role;b. Executive equity incentive can not positively regulate the relationship between government R & D subsidies and enterprise technological innovation, but can positively regulate the relationship between enterprise technological innovation and enterprise performance;c. Equity concentration plays a negative regulatory role in the "government subsidies-technological innovation-enterprise performance" action route. Therefore, the government should further refine and perfect the subsidy policy, formulate the selection criteria for enterprise innovative behavior, and ensure the limited funds to bring maximum benefits;the enterprises should appropriately strengthen equity incentive, enhance the initiative and enthusiasm of senior managers, reduce the shareholding ratio of major shareholders appropriately, and weaken the dissimilation behavior of large shareholders’ "occupying" the interests of minority shareholders.