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双重股权对创始人控制权的影响研究——以小米集团与优刻得为例 被引量:1

Research on the influence of dual-class share structure on founder control—taking Xiaomi Group and Ucloud for examples
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摘要 小米集团和优刻得分别是我国香港和内地第一家以差异表决权完成首次公开发行股票并上市的公司。梳理两公司双重股权对创始人控制权的影响,可发现:两公司的商业模式均需要在初始阶段进行长期投入,创始人掌握控制权利于公司实施长期发展战略,投资者对创始人人力资本的认可使得创始人在持续募集股权资金的同时保持对公司的控制。创始人通过持有多倍表决权类股票实现以较低比例的持股获得股东大会普通决议和特别决议的控制权,通过占有过半数董事席位获得董事会控制权。创始人控制也可能会导致创始人侵害其他股东利益的风险,可以通过增强信息披露、规范特别表决权的适用范围、完善股东权益保护的法规制度三个方面来降低这一风险。 Xiaomi Group and Ucloud are the first Chinese companies in Hong Kong and the mainland to complete initial public offerings and go public with different voting rights respectively.Combing the two dual-class share structure impact on the control of the founder of the company,it can be found that:both the companies’business models need require long-term investment in the initial stage,the founder’s control is conducive to the company’s long-term strategy,and investors’recognition of founder’s human capital allows founders to maintain control of the company while continuing to raise equity capital.By holding multiple voting shares,the founder can gain the control of the general and special resolutions of the shareholders’meeting with a lower proportion of shares;the control of the board of directors by holding more than half of the seats on the board of directors.Founder control may also lead to the risk that founders will infringe on the interests of other shareholders.So this risk can be reduced by enhancing the information disclosure,standardizing the application scope of special voting rights,and perfecting the laws and regulations for the protection of shareholders’rights.
作者 于培友 王妤 杨建军 YU Pei-you;WANG Yu;YANG Jian-jun(College of Economics and Management,Qingdao University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266061,China;RRS Supply Chain Techndogy Co.,Ltd.Qingdao 266101,China)
出处 《青岛科技大学学报(社会科学版)》 2020年第3期55-61,共7页 Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词 双重股权 差异表决权 创始人控制权 dual-class share structure differential voting rights founder control
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