摘要
针对产业集群协同创新中核心企业和配套企业的知识共享问题,通过构建微分博弈模型,运用HJB方程分别考察三种知识共享博弈情形下核心企业和配套企业的最优知识共享策略。通过三种博弈结果的比较分析发现:Stackelberg主从博弈情形下,知识共享投入补贴作为一种激励策略可促进配套企业知识共享意愿、双方各自知识共享收益以及双方知识共享总收益均优于Nash非合作情形;协同合作博弈情形下双方各自知识共享意愿、各自知识共享收益和双方知识共享总收益均优于非合作情形,且收益分配系数α存在一个阈值,可实现双方个体收益的帕累托最优。最后,通过数值算例分析验证了理论推导的结果。
According to the knowledge sharing question of core enterprises and supporting enterprises in industrial cluster synergetic innovation,it analyses separately the knowledge sharing strategies of core enterprises and supporting enterprises in the case of three different knowledge sharing games using the HJB equation by constructing the differential game model.Comparing the three kinds of games analysis results,we find that:in the case of Stackelberg game,knowledge sharing input subsidy as a kind of incentive strategy can promote the knowledge sharing desire of supporting enterprises,the knowledge sharing revenue of each side and the total revenue of both sides are better than Nash game.In the case of cooperative game,the knowledge sharing desire,knowledge sharing revenue of each side and the total revenue of both sides are better than the non cooperative case.There is a threshold in the revenue distribution level coefficient,the Pareto optimality of both individual revenue can be achieved.Finally,the results of theoretical derivation are verified by numerical examples.
作者
马永红
刘海礁
柳清
MA Yong-hong;LIU Hai-jiao;LIU Qing(School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China;Enterprise Innovation Research Institute, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China;School of Architecture, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第9期82-88,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71373060)
国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(14AGL004)
黑龙江省自然科学基金资助项目(14AGL004)
黑龙江省社会科学基金资助项目(13D011)。
关键词
产业集群
协同创新
知识共享
微分博弈
HJB方程
industrial cluster
synergetic innovation
knowledge sharing
differential game
HJB equation