混合股权制衡度与真实盈余管理行为

Mixed Ownership Balance and Real Earnings Management Behavior

混合所有制改革形成了非国有股与国有股相互制衡的股权结构。通过研究国有企业中非国有股权和国有股权相互制衡的程度与真实盈余管理行为的关系发现:混合股权制衡度显著抑制了国有企业的真实盈余管理行为,但当国有性质股权占比小于非国有性质股权占比时上述抑制作用减弱。另外,参与混合所有制改革的金融类、外资类股权相比民营类股权制衡度,对真实盈余管理行为发挥了更显著的治理作用。机制检验发现,混合股权制衡一方面通过提升业绩,提高对真实盈余管理动机的抑制作用,从而缓解了真实盈余管理行为;另一方面通过提升内部控制对真实盈余管理的抑制作用,降低了真实盈余管理行为。以上结论有助于深化国有企业混合所有制改革,为提升混改中的审计监管质量提供参考。

The reform of mixed ownership has formed a shareholding structure with checks and balances between non-state shares and state shares.By studying the relationship between the degree of checks and balances between non-state-owned equity and state-owned equity and the behavior of real earnings management,it is found that the degree of checks and balances of mixed equity significantly inhibits the behavior of real earnings management of state-owned enterprises,but when the proportion of state-owned equity is smaller than that of non-state-owned equity,the inhibition effect is weakened.In addition,the degree of checks and balances of mixed shares of financial and foreign equity is stronger than that of private equity.The mechanism test found that the mixed equity balance alleviated the real earnings management behaviors by improving performance and inhibiting the motivation of real earnings management;on the other hand,it reduced the real earnings management behaviors by enhancing internal control.The above conclusions are of certain reference value to the deepening of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and the supervision of the real earnings management in the mixed reform.