利率市场化程度、审计师声誉与银行风险管理

Interest Rate Liberalization,Auditor Reputation and Bank Risk Management

采用2002-2016年我国177家银行的财务信息,并运用法规描述法对各年的利率市场化程度进行测量,检验利率市场化程度、审计师声誉与银行风险管理间的关系。研究发现:当利率市场化程度提升时,商业银行的风险管理强度会显著下降;选聘了高声誉审计师的银行会显著提高风险管理强度。在利率市场化程度提升时,相较于低声誉审计师,高声誉审计师帮助银行提高风险管理强度的作用更为显著。上述结果对监管机构利用审计声誉机制督促银行进行风险管理具有一定的借鉴意义。

Collecting the financial information of 177 banks in China from 2002 to 2016,using law description method,this paper measures the degree of interest rate liberalization and tests the relationship among interest rate liberalization,auditor reputation and bank risk management.The research shows as follows:when the degree of Interest rate liberalization increases,the intensity of risk management will be significantly weakened;when banks select high reputation auditors,the intensity of risk management will be significantly strengthened;when the degree of interest rate liberalization is enhanced,high reputation auditors will help banks significantly increase the intensity of risk management as compared with low reputation auditors.The above results have a certain reference significance for regulators to use audit reputation mechanism to urge banks to carry out risk management.