摘要
本文基于动态公共物品博弈架构,通过开展田野实验,分析了外生激励对不同偏好农户合作水平的影响。实验结果发现:第一,外生激励可以提高自利偏好群体的合作水平;第二,外生激励提升了社会偏好群体的相对合作比例,但没有改变社会偏好群体的绝对合作水平;第三,外生激励对社会偏好群体的内生激励具有挤出效应,但这种挤出效应只存在于外生激励实验的初期;第四,外生激励对于合作水平的促进效果并不是质变式的改进。以上结论表明,在农村公共事务治理过程中,要充分重视社会偏好的内生激励作用,同时避免不当外部激励措施产生的挤出效应。
To examine the roles of exogenous incentives on the cooperation level of farmers who have different preferences,we design a field experiment of dynamic public-good game.The results of the experiment show a positive correlation between exogenous incentives and cooperation level of self-interested groups,and a positive correlation between exogenous incentives and relative cooperation ratio but no relation between exogenous incentives and absolute cooperation level of social preference group.Besides,exogenous incentives have a crowding effect on the endogenous incentives of the social preference group,but the crowding-out effect exists only in the first round of the exogenous incentive experiment.Further,the positive effect of exogenous incentives on the cooperation level is not a qualitative change.On the whole,the role of endogenous incentives should be valued and the crowding effect of defective exogenous incentives should be avoided in the governance of commons in the rural area.
作者
贾小虎
马恒运
秦国庆
JIA Xiaohu;MA Hengyun;QIN Guoqing
出处
《农业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第9期79-91,共13页
Journal of Agrotechnical Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金规划项目(编号:14BGL093)
国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71403082)
河南省软科学研究计划项目(编号:132400410032)
河南省高等学校重点科研项目(编号:19B630008)
高等学校博士科研启动基金项目(编号:30601678)。
关键词
外生激励
合作水平
公共物品博弈
田野实验
Exogenous incentives
Cooperation level
Public-good game
Field experiment