他心问题之布伦塔诺学派隐线:认知科学史的考察

Hidden Cue of Brentano School in Other Minds Problems:A Survey from the History of Cognitive Science

在认知科学时代,他心问题作为认识论基础匿身于读心、社会认知、常识心理学等诸多具有“家族相似性”的论题、概念与实体理论之中。然而,从布伦塔诺的意向性学说,到第二代布伦塔诺学派的代表性人物迈农的基于判断的情绪理论,再到第三代布伦塔诺学派的继承人海德的归因理论,可以探赜索隐出一条理解他心问题的重要线索。上述进路直接启迪了意向立场、情绪理解和心智理论等认知科学的核心议题,并与近期兴起的直接社会知觉理论与镜像神经元学说之间存在深刻的理论勾连。

In the era of cognitive science,the problem of other minds,as the basis of epistemology,is embodied in many topics,concepts and entity theories with“family resemblance”,such as mind-reading,social cognition and folk psychology.However,from the Franz Brentano’s theory of intentionality,to the Brentano’s student,Alexius Meinong’s emotion theory based on the judgment,and then to the third generation of the heir to the school of Brentano,Fritz Heider’s attribution theory,can unravel an important clue to understand other minds problems.This approach directly illuminates the core issues of cognitive science,such as intentional stance,emotional understanding and theory of mind,and has a profound theoretical connection with the recent rise of the theory of direct social perception and the theory of mirror neurons.