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控股股东对财务重述的影响研究——基于法律制度的调节作用 被引量:4

Impact of Controlling Shareholders on Financial Restatement:Adjustments of the Legal System
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摘要 本文以2012―2016年中国上市公司非平衡面板数据为研究样本,采用Logit模型实证检验终极控股股东、法律制度与财务重述之间的关系。研究发现:现金流量权越大的公司发生财务重述的可能性越小;控制权与现金流量权分离度越大的公司发生财务重述的可能性越大;终极控股股东是国有公司,其发生财务重述的可能性显著低于终极控股股东是民营等非国有公司;法律制度环境好的地区的上市公司发生财务重述的可能性较低,良好的法律制度环境能够抑制终极控股股东诱发财务重述的可能性。进一步研究发现,终极控股股东是中央国有企业,现金流量权对财务重述的抑制作用显著高于地方国有企业,而控制权与现金流量权的分离度诱发财务重述的可能性显著低于地方国有企业,法律制度对控制权和现金流量权分离度诱发财务重述的可能性的抑制作用显著低于地方国有企业。 The paper empirically tests the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders,the legal system and the financial restatement with a Logit model,using an unbalanced panel data of all the non-financial listed companies from 2012 to 2016 as a research sample.The results show:the firms with more cash flow rights have remarkably lower possibility of the financial restatement;the firms with more divergence between control and cash flow rights have higher possibility of the financial restatement;the firms whose ultimate controlling shareholders are state-owned companies have significantly lower possibility of financial restatement than those whose ultimate control shareholders are not state-owned enterprises;the firms located in areas with a good legal system have significantly lower possibility of financial restatement,as the positive relationship between ultimate controlling shareholders and financial restatements is attenuated by the legal system.Moreover,we observe that,when compared with local holding enterprises,the firms whose ultimate controlling shareholders are central holding companies have(1)more prominent negative influence of cash flow rights on financial restatement,(2)more pronounced positive influence of divergence between control and cash flow rights on financial restatement and,(3)significantly lower restraining effect of the legal system on the positive relationship between separation degree of control and cash flow rights and financial restatement.
作者 肖作平 金虹敏 苏忠秦 Xiao Zuoping;Jin Hongmin;Su Zhongqin
出处 《证券市场导报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第10期12-22,32,共12页 Securities Market Herald
基金 国家自然科学基金项目“腐败,社会网络与权益资本成本”(项目编号:72072049) 国家自然科学基金项目“法律诉讼,社会网络与债务契约”(项目编号:71772154) 国家自然科学基金项目“终极控股股东,社会资本与银行贷款契约”(项目编号:71472157) 浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目“信息优势与企业并购行为——基于关系网络的视角”(项目编号:17NDJC227YB)。
关键词 终极控股股东 法律制度 会计信息质量 财务重述 ultimate controlling shareholder legal system quality of accounting information financial restatement
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