媒体与机构投资者关注对内部控制的交互作用——来自国有企业的经验数据

Impacts of Interactions between Media Coverage and Investor Attention on Internal Control:Empirical Investigation on State-owned Listed Firms in China

以2009—2015年中国A股国有上市公司为样本,研究媒体关注度、机构投资者关注及其交互作用对国有企业内部控制有效性的影响,以及上述影响在不同绩效情境下的差异。研究表明:媒体和机构投资者关注对国有企业内部控制质量均有显著提升作用;机构投资者持股的增多会削弱媒体关注提升内部控制质量的作用效果,即二者之间存在显著的替代效应。进一步,这一替代效应受到企业期望绩效差距的显著影响,即随着企业实际绩效对期望绩效的顺差增大,机构投资者持股的替代作用更加明显,这为政府利用外部方监督国有企业提供有效政策依据。

Taking A-share state-owned listed firms in 2009-2015,this paper explores how media coverage,institutional investors and their interactions influence effectiveness of internal control of listed firms,and differences of influences under different performance situation.The research shows the following.Media coverage and institutional investors have significant promoting effects on internal control quality of state-owned listed enterprises.The increase of institutional investors shareholding will weaken the effect of media coverage,that is,there is a significant substitution effect between media attention and institutional investors.Further,the substitution effect is significantly affected by the expected performance gap.The advices of this paper provide effective reference policies for government to supervise state-owned listed enterprises by using external parties.