污染治理视角下的政府与企业双主体互动博弈行为研究

Research on the Interactive Game Between Government and Enterprises from the Perspective of Pollution Control

环境与经济发展密不可分,区域环境的现状在很大程度上受当地经济发展的制约。为了研究污染治理视角下的政府与制造业企业的行为选择,基于博弈论方法,研究静态博弈及多阶段动态重复博弈中政府与企业的私人行为选择,探究地方政府的环境政策决策行为对企业生产活动的影响。研究表明,制造业企业与地方政府的行为选择很大程度上受到他们的收益影响,且企业对未来收益的期望对企业的决策行为具有关键性影响。基于此,提出以下对策建议:一是实行严格的奖惩制度,经济刺激手段采取予以激励;二是采取一定的行政手段,合理应用规制工具;三是充分发挥社会公众力量,引导社会公众进行实时的监督。

The environment and the economic development are inseparable,and the present situation of the regional environment is restricted by the local economic development to a great extent.In order to study the behavior choice between government and manufacturing enterprises from the perspective of pollution control,this paper,based on Game Theory,studies the private behavior choice between government and manufacturing enterprises in static game and dynamic and repeated multi-stage game,so as to explore the impact of local government′s environmental policy decision-making behavior on the production activities of enterprises.The research shows that the behavior choice of manufacturing enterprises and local governments is greatly influenced by their earnings,and the expectation of future earnings plays a key role in the decision-making of enterprises.Based on this,this paper puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions:to implement a strict system of rewards and punishments and adopt certain economic methods to provide incentives for economic stimulus,to adopt certain administrative methods and rationally apply regulatory tools,and to give full play to the power of the public and guide the public to conduct real-time supervision.